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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mother of Exiles “[c]ries . . . [w]ith silent lips, ‘[g]ive me 
your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled masses, yearning to breathe free, 
[t]he wretched refuse of your teeming shore.’”1 The words of Emma 
Lazarus have, since 1883, captured the vision of what America is 
supposed to be: an immigrant state welcome to all comers. Yet, despite 
the warmth and optimism expressed in “The New Colossus,” the 
words are in some sense a forgotten ideal. Although we imagine that 
the advance of time brings progress, one may find that in the case of 
immigration policy we have suffered a regression. Lady Liberty was 
more receptive to immigrants in 1883 than she is in 2018. 
This, of course, is not to say that the past was in any way idyllic, 
that racism was not far more rampant then than at present, nor that 
the law lacked highly discriminatory provisions. Both society and the 
law have greatly improved. However, the fact remains that in 1883 the 
flow of immigrants into the country was highly unrestricted, and the 
law often encouraged immigration—despite a few restrictions which 
are sources of national shame, and aberrant to the general structure of 
the old system.2 
Today, rather than taking in people of all backgrounds, 
wherever they may come from, the law and its administrators pick and 
choose who is let into the country.3 Every year, millions of people wait 
                                                 
 1 EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883). 
 2 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 operated as a general exception to 
America’s open immigration policy and barred any further immigration from China. 
Likewise, the Naturalization Act of 1790 barred immigrants of non-European origin 
from naturalizing and becoming citizens. However, neither act comprehensively 
regulated the flow of immigration itself. See WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL’Y 
CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 1–4 (2012), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/opport
unity_exclusion_011312.pdf [hereinafter “OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION”] 
(detailing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Naturalization Act of 1790 and 
the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798). 
 3 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin (Sept. 
2017) (setting exact limits on the issuance of visas, based on region, familial 
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in line to gain admission to the U.S., and some of them end up waiting 
decades for green cards.4 In fact, a very recent article revealed that 
some green card applicants will have to wait over one-hundred and 
fifty years for admission.5 They are delayed because each year the U.S. 
only admits a few hundred thousand of each category of immigrants. 
Admissions are based on arbitrary statutory determinations of what the 
country and its citizens need, and not the demand for various kinds of 
visas. These classifications are arbitrary because, despite their 
appearance, they do not comport with the economic and familial needs 
of the U.S. and its citizens, have been written for ease of 
administration, and are rooted in the subjective value judgements of 
the statute’s framers. 
The law dictates what types of family members are “immediate 
relative[s],” as well as what kinds and how many laborers and 
professionals are useful and not detrimental to our economy.6 The 
number of visas provided to foreign workers, family members of U.S. 
citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents are allocated accordingly. 
Now, rather than finding refuge, safe harbor, and a new life in America, 
the huddled masses must wait patiently outside the golden door, 
hoping that the quota is large enough to admit them and that their 
names will be called. 
The delays created by the modern quota system, detailed in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), adversely impact all other 
aspects of the immigration system. Naturally, long wait times and 
stringent requirements to keep one’s visa classification encourage 
illegal immigration. The system is so impractical that faithfully abiding 
                                                 
preference, and worker priority); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (detailing how limits on visa 
issuance and preferences are to be calculated). 
 4 CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., GOING TO THE BACK OF 
THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND WAIT TIMES, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. 3–4 (2013). 
 5 See David Bier, 150 Year Wait for Indian Immigrants With Advanced Degrees, 
CATO INSTITUTE (June 8, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/150-year-
wait-indian-immigrants-advanced-degrees (explaining that EB-2 applicants from 
India will have to wait over 150 years, compared to Indian EB-1 and EB-3 applicants, 
who will respectively have to wait 6 and 17 years for their green card applications to 
become current). 
 6 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(A). 
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by it creates too high of an opportunity cost.7 It does not allow one 
the flexibility one requires in order to make important decisions 
relating to one’s career, family, or community life, because those 
changes may alter one’s immigration status. By consequence, it may 
often seem more practical for one to break the rules.8 Although rates 
of illegal immigration from Mexico have been down since the recession 
of 2008—and the general rate of illegal immigration has remained 
static9—the specter of illegal immigration continues to exacerbate 
concerns about border security, sovereignty, and health screening. 
However, if the demand for visas was not perpetually out of step with 
the supply, and the wait times to get a visa were not so egregious, then 
the incentives to enter the country illegally, or without inspection, 
would be drastically reduced. Further, without the quota, there would 
be no need to sort people into various “preference” categories, based 
on arbitrary determinations of the person’s economic value or familial 
importance. Absent this—and the strategic, complicated application 
schemes would-be immigrants must center their lives around—there 
would also be less of an incentive to let one’s visa expire. One would 
be able to maintain one’s status while still maintaining social and 
economic flexibility. 
There are few people, if any, who would assert that the 
country’s immigration system is not broken. This is the common 
consensus, even though many would disagree on what a better system 
would look like or whether it should be more liberal or more restricted. 
Many proposed reforms place too much of an emphasis on security 
                                                 
 7 Walter A. Ewing, Symposium, Globalization, Security & Human Rights: 
Immigration in the Twenty-First Century: From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating 
Immigration to the United States 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 445, 450–52 (2005) 
[hereinafter “Globalization, Security & Human Rights”]. 
 8 While any immigration attorney may point out that there are serious 
consequences to violating immigration laws, and that it is never wise to do so, it is 
the actions people commonly feel compelled to take that indicate what the balance 
of incentives are. In this case, harsh legal repercussions are often not enough to 
dissuade violation of the law, because the law is itself too onerous to follow. 
 9 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RES. CTR., OVERALL NUMBER 




2019 American Immigration: A Path of Return 7:1 
191 
and sovereignty and actually seek to exercise more control over 
immigration flows.10 These approaches are counterproductive. 
Attempts to restrict immigration conflict with U.S. economic policy 
and the broader trends and migratory incentives created by 
globalization.11 Yet, even among more liberal-minded reformers, most 
assume that quotas must be a feature. Some suggest expanding the 
number of people admitted in general, while others wish to change the 
emphasis the INA places on various preference categories.12 In 
particular, there is a push to prioritize worker visa applicants over 
family visa applicants, altering the focus of the immigration system.13 
These reformers ignore the fact that most immigration is driven by 
economic push and pull factors that cannot be accommodated by a 
system of central management. The flow of people must be allocated 
naturally, otherwise, the needs of the U.S., its citizens, and immigrants 
will not be met. A scant few reformers argue for a market-centered 
model of immigration that is greatly unmanaged. Yet, they are often 
left out of the popular dialogue, and occasionally fail to argue for the 
complete abolition of quotas. 
The imposition of any form of quota will always come at a high 
cost to both immigrants and U.S. citizens. No mere adjustment of 
quota sizes or changes to immigration priorities and preferences can 
adequately address the issues with the U.S. immigration system. Truly 
comprehensive reform requires the complete abolition of quotas as 
well as any type of immigrant prioritization scheme; this is not to say, 
however, that other laws and regulations relating to public safety, 
public health, or criminal activity need to be abandoned. By first 
assessing the failures of the present system, the causes of those failures, 
                                                 
 10 Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 449–51. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 201, 207 (2005); Meriam N. Alrashid, The 
“Comprehensive” Immigration Reform: Only as Good as the Bureaucracy it is Built Upon, 
Symposium, A New Year and the Old Debate: Has Immigration Reform Reformed Anything?, 
13 NEXUS J. OPINION 29 (2007–2008). 
 13 See generally DARRELL M. WEST, BRAIN GAIN: RETHINKING U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2010). West argues that future immigration policy should 
focus on recruiting bright and creative minds to drive economic growth, using what 
he calls the “Einstein principle,” and move away from a family centered policy. Id. at 
126–55 (explaining the Einstein principle). 
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and the inadequacies of reform, this comment will demonstrate the 
need for the abolition of quotas and preference categories. Then, using 
pre-modern immigration policy as a guideline, it will attempt to show 
that a feasible balance can be struck between the legitimate interests of 
the state and unrestricted immigration flows, despite objections to the 
contrary. Finally, this comment will put forward a model proposal for 
comprehensive reform. 
The first section of this comment provides a brief history of 
U.S. immigration policy and its evolution from an open policy to a 
restricted one. The next section outlines the basic structure of the U.S. 
immigration system under the Immigration and Nationality Act and 
also assesses the functionality of that system. That section also outlines 
various attempts at immigration reform, their failures, and their 
promises. The final section details the comment’s policy 
recommendations and the shifts in cultural attitudes that would make 
these policy changes possible. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION 
The history of American immigration policy can largely be 
divided into three eras: the founding through 1920, 1920 – 1965, and 
1965 – present. During the first era, immigration was largely 
unmanaged, despite several regulations concerning naturalization, 
information, and processing.14 Following international shifts in trade 
and migration policy resulting from the Great War, the U.S. exerted 
more control over immigration and migration.15 Quotas were 
introduced as a means of managing the flow of immigrants from places 
that were seen as culturally and racially undesirable—achieving in 
broad scope what the Exclusion Acts had attempted decades earlier.16 
Finally, amidst the civil rights movement, the quotas based on national 
origins were abolished, and new quotas emphasizing family unity were 
put in place.17 However, recently, as national security has become a 
greater concern, modern immigration reform has centered on 
                                                 
 14 See OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 1–7. 
 15 See id. at 1, 4. 
 16 See id. at 4. 
 17 See id. at 5. 
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enforcement of the immigration code and not on the justifications or 
sustainability of quotas.18 
A. The Era of Open Immigration 
From 1790 until 1921, the United States Government made no 
comprehensive attempt to manage the numbers of people entering, 
settling, and working in the country.19 Instead, early attempts at 
regulation were more limited in scope: the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798 empowered the state to deport immigrants;20 the Naturalization 
Act of 1790 limited opportunities for citizenship to immigrants of 
European descent; and the precursor to the Chinese Exclusion Act, 
passed in 1875, limited the rights of criminals and prostitutes to 
immigrate.21 Only the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 ultimately barred 
the further admission of Chinese immigrants, resulting in the egregious 
deportation and dispossession of Chinese people residing in the 
country.22 But far from discouraging immigration itself, the nation’s 
growth demanded its encouragement. The Homestead Act of 1862, 
aiming to motivate westward expansion, actually incentivized 
immigration to the United States.23 This general condition of openness 
did not change until the passage of the National Origins Quota Act of 
1921.24 
B. The National-Origins Quota Era 
The Chinese Exclusion Act could be considered a modern 
immigration law, relating more to the present body of law than to the 
general policy of open, quota-less immigration that preceded it.25 It was 
                                                 
 18 See id. at 7. 
 19 See id. at 2–4. 
 20 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, a supra note 2, at 2. 
 21 Id. See also, Jan C. Ting, Other Than a Chinaman: How U.S. Immigration Law 
Resulted from and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 302–05 (1995) (detailing history of immigration 
and Chinese exclusion); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 22 Id. 
 23 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Jan C. Ting even goes so far as to argue that modern immigration law is 
the product of early attempts to restrict Chinese immigration, and identifies several 
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the first time the state had attempted to regulate the flow of people 
from one part of the world into the U.S. The core provisions of the 
Act remained in effect until 1943, even when the 1790 restrictions on 
naturalization were abandoned in 1906.26 Yet, the first truly modern 
immigration law was passed in 1921 and established quotas based on 
national origin.27 Between the administrative keenness of the 
progressive movement, the new security measures imposed as a result 
of the Great War, and several large waves of immigration stoking 
nativist sentiment, the nation was finally moved to adopt a centrally 
managed system of immigration. Under the new law, quotas were set 
for immigrants to be accepted in varying proportion from different 
regions of the globe based on their perceived cultural compatibility and 
desirability.28 In this sense, the new quota system was founded on the 
same spirit as the Chinese Exclusion Act but applied in a more general 
and expansive manner. 
C. The Modern Era 
The national origins quota system remained in place until 
approximately 1952 but was not entirely replaced until the passage of 
the Immigration Act of 1965.29 In the spirit of the civil rights era, the 
Act abolished the previous quota system which focused on national 
                                                 
vestiges of the exclusion in the current law, including: (1) restrictions on immigration 
from countries whose total visa applications meet or exceed 7% of the total number 
of immigrants allowed, adversely impacting Chinese applicants; (2) and the NP-5 and 
OP-1 “diversity” visa programs, which underhandedly curbed Chinese immigration 
and heavily favor Western European immigrants. Ting, supra note 21, at 308–09. 
 26 Id. at 305. 
 27 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 4. 
 28 Id. The Quota Law of 1921 established an overall allowance of 350,000 
new immigrants per year, and fixed a maximum per-country cap of 3% the total 
proportion of U.S. citizens from each country of origin as of the 1910 census; this 
heavily favored European immigration, and most of the U.S. population was of 
European descent. Id. The law also retained the bans on Asian and Chinese 
immigration, but curiously exempted North American and Latin American nations 
from the overall quotas. Id. The 1924 National Origins Act reduced the total 
allowable number of new immigrants to 165,000 per year, and reduced the percent 
of immigrants per-country to 2%, with the basis of that percentage being the 1890 
census population (which was even whiter). Id. 
 29 Id. at 5. 
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origins.30 Not only was the national origins quota obsolete, it was racist 
and arbitrary.31 Instead, the INA enacted a system of preferences based 
on familial relationships and various worker categories.32 In this sense, 
the new system attempted to direct immigration flows based on the 
nation’s real interest. However, despite abandoning regional quotas, 
the INA preference categories still sorted potential immigrants into 
various groups and set quotas for each group according to formulas 
which will be discussed in more detail later in the comment.33 
Despite the good intentions of the INA and subsequent 
reforms, the system remains highly discriminatory due to the 
mathematical realities of the quota system, population differences, and 
varying demand for visas relative to preference categories. Barriers to 
entry also contribute to “illegal” immigration, while border restrictions 
transform temporary economic migrants into permanent settlers. 
Beyond that, quotas continue to create large disparities between 
domestic supply and demand for workers and divide families for years 
at a time. People seeking to immigrate are only issued visas if the 
allowance cap for their given category has not yet been reached.34 
Worse still, a change in age, employment, or marriage can alter a 
person’s application category and send them to the back of a new 
line.35 As the years drag on, applicants can be separated from families 
and are often left in periods of legal limbo. Employers miss 
opportunities to hire useful people in a timely manner and are often 
precluded from hiring the best because arbitrary preference categories 
limit the availability of potential employees based on the nature of the 
job or the skill it requires. As one might expect, the occupational 
quotas are nearly always misaligned with the demands of the present 
                                                 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. at 5–6. 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (allocating visas based on immigrant preference 
categories). 
 34 See, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin (Sept. 
2017) (setting exact limits on the issuance of visas, based on region, familial 
preference, and worker priority); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (detailing how limits on visa 
issuance and preferences are to be calculated). 
 35 CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. I, 
GOING TO THE BACK OF THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND 
WAIT TIMES 5–7 (2013). 
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labor market. Likewise, while immediate family members of U.S. 
citizens are not subject to quotas, the immediate family members of 
Lawful Permanent Residents and all the extended family members of 
either are subject to quotas. This leaves many good people deprived of 
their loved ones based on ill-fitting legal definitions of “closeness.” 
More recently, following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, there 
has been a radical shift in the organization of the U.S. immigration 
system. In 2002, former agencies which managed immigration, such as 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), were consolidated 
and became the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).36 The 
creation of the DHS embodies the new approach that the U.S. has 
adopted regarding immigration. The primary concern of the state is 
now national security and the enforcement of immigration laws.37 
Economic growth, labor interests, and family unity have become of 
secondary importance.38 This is in spite of the adoption of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.39 While these policies were enacted 
under the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration ultimately 
deported record numbers of immigrants.40 The current administration 
has pushed for increased funding for the U.S. Border Patrol—another 
sub-department of the DHS—and attempted to increase travel 
restrictions from middle eastern countries.41 Despite the issues created 
by the quota system and management of visa allocation, these subjects 
have failed to garner the attention they deserve in legislative and 
administrative circles. 
                                                 
 36 See, “Who Joined the DHS?” accessible at www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs. 
 37 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 7. 
 38 Ernie Garcia, National Security, Unskilled Labor, and Why the United States 
Should Overhaul Its Immigration Policy, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 1043, 1055–56 (2010). 
 39 See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 451–53. 
 40 MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, SARAH PIERCE, & JESSICA BOLTER, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST., THE OBAMA RECORD ON DEPORTATIONS: DEPORTER IN CHIEF OR 
NOT? (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-record-
deportations-deporter-chief-or-not (indicating that President Obama deported 
5,281,115 people over the course of eight years). 
 41 Caroline Kelly & Todd J. Gillman, Trump’s Plan for Border Patrol, ICE Hiring 
Surges Face Timing, Security Obstacles, DALLAS NEWS (July 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/07/06/trumps-plan-border-
patrol-ice-hiring-surges-face-timing-security-obstacles. 
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A good example of the government’s current emphasis on 
immigration enforcement over constructive reform is perhaps the 
recent parent-child separation scandal. While in the past practical 
issues surrounding the detention of immigrants might have 
occasionally led to the separation of detained parents or children, the 
Trump administration sought to transform this into an official, zero-
tolerance policy.42 It was thought that separating families of 
immigrants apprehended at the border would deter illegal 
immigration.43 However, it did not dissuade many central American 
refugees, who came to the U.S. seeking asylum.44 In total, well over 
two-thousand children were separated from their parents, and the 
DHS is currently holding approximately two-thousand and fifty-three 
of them.45 Public outcry caused the administration to reconsider this 
policy, and now children are detained alongside their parents.46 The 
INA was written to encourage family unity by prioritizing visas for 
close family members.47 While those particular provisions of the INA 
are related to visa allocation and not immigration enforcement, this 
episode illustrates the ways in which the government has recently put 
the cart before the horse. The current administration consciously 
attempted to divide families in order to enforce the law. Moreover, 
these actions were a result of administrative guidance and orders from 
the President rather than a product of legislation.48 The structure of 
the law has remained the same. 
                                                 
 42 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: ZERO TOLERANCE—
TOLERANCE PROSECUTION AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION (2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/23/fact-sheet-zero-tolerance-prosecution-
and-family-reunification. 
 43 Dara Lind, The Trump Administration’s Separation of Families at the Border, 
Explained, VOX (June 15, 2018, 12:03 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/11/17443198/children-immigrant-families-
separated-parents. 
 44 Id. 
 45 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (explaining 
that it was the intent of Congress to protect familial unity). 
 48 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42. 
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III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
A. The Current System’s Structure 
The quota system is not perfect and has many problems. 
Individual visa applicants wait for years to be approved for admission 
into the U.S. There are also vast disparities between the number of 
visas issued to each country and the demand for visas in particular 
countries. While in part the general imbalance between visa supply and 
demand can be explained by the size of the quotas themselves as well 
as the number of visas allocated to each preference category, such 
flaws are the result of the INA’s core architecture. Therefore, mere 
adjustments to the number of visas available to be issued or to the 
preferences which govern their issuance cannot fix the problems 
caused by quotas, even if such adjustments may temporarily ameliorate 
them. Moreover, the policies dictated by the INA, compounded by its 
subsequent reforms, run counter to the other economic and trade goals 
of the U.S. and are, in fact, exacerbated by these other goals. The 
promotion of free trade and the embrace of globalization necessarily 
spurs immigration.49 Despite the good intentions of the framers and 
reformers of the current law, the system is unfortunately set up to fail. 
Immigration is fundamentally economic in nature.50 However, 
it has scarcely been viewed that way by lawmakers. Rather, it is often 
viewed as a matter of law enforcement and, more recently, national 
security.51 To the extent that immigration is viewed as economic in 
nature, it is often seen through a protectionist lens.52 With the 
exception of persons possessing extraordinary ability or international 
renown, most worker visa applicants must show that they have an 
employer waiting to hire them.53 Further, the employer must show that 
                                                 
 49 Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 445–46. 
 50 See id. 
 51 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 52 Wadhia, supra note 12, at 207 (explaining that most comprehensive reform 
proposals include strong measures protecting U.S. labor interests, workers’ rights, 
and bargaining rights against competition from immigrants). 
 53 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1–3). 
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there are no suitable domestic workers available to do the job.54 
However, the core emphasis of the INA is on familial unity, and the 
vast majority of visas issued are allocated to foreign family members 
of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents.55 Economic 
productivity and efficiency are a secondary goal at best.56 
The INA quotas are based on a framework of preference 
categories which divide people into several different classes of family 
members and prospective workers.57 Each subclass of family members 
and workers has its own base numerical limit and floor for visa 
amounts.58 However, the INA provides formulas for the reallocation 
of visas from one preference category to another. In the event that a 
given category is oversubscribed, visas can be reallocated from 
another, undersubscribed category.59 The numerical limit for each 
category is calculated by adding and subtracting the amount of used or 
unused visas from the previous fiscal year.60 If the previous year’s 
numbers drive the visa issuance limit for the following year too low, 
some preference categories provide a minimum floor for available 
visas.61 For instance, the maximum number of family-based immigrant 
visas issued each year is calculated by subtracting the number of 
                                                 
 54 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3). With regard to this provision, it should also be 
noted that waivers are available for skilled professionals, but not for unskilled and 
agricultural workers. See, id. The added competition of imported labor is often viewed 
as a threat to the wages and job security of domestic workers. 
 55 Darrel M. West takes particular issue with this, arguing that workers ought 
to take priority, and that many of the economic problems associated with 
immigration result from the policy emphasis on family unity rather than economic 
productivity. West believes that the U.S. needs a greater proportion of skilled and 
educated people entering the country, and that encouraging familial immigration 
allows a higher proportion of less productive people to take their place. WEST, supra 
note 13, at 126–55. 
 56 Note below, the difference between the number of available visas for the 
various familial and employment-based categories. The September 2017 Bulletin 
reported that a total of 226,000 visas were available for those waiting in the familial 
preference categories, as opposed to only 140,000 for those in the employment-based 
categories. U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 3. 
 57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). 
 60 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153(a). 
 61 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1152. 
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“immediate family members” admitted last fiscal year from the 
480,000-visa ceiling and then adding the number of unused 
employment visas left over from the last fiscal year.62 In spite of this, 
the total number of familial visas issued cannot fall below 226,000.63 
The quota formulas provided by the INA are neat, easily 
calculable, and readily predictable from year to year. While this is 
certainly administratively convenient, quota calculation is not a 
scientific or rational practice. The quota formula’s logic is based on the 
value judgements of the INA framers and subsequent reformers and 
is not designed to align with the needs of the real world. Rather, what 
is and is not preferable is a matter of opinion which, however well 
informed at its inception, will inevitably fall out of step with present 
conditions. For example, the decision to favor family relations over 
economic productivity is a moral and sentimental determination. 
To be scientific, each visa allocated must be directed toward 
meeting the actual and specific needs of society.64 However, this is 
impossible because quotas and preference categories are stiff and 
mechanical; they cannot anticipate the exact needs of people or the 
proper balance of visas issued to any class of people because those 
needs are always changing. The needs of society and the economy are 
determined by the various and several needs of the individuals which 
comprise it.65 Put simply, the exact degree of benefit that can be 
provided to an individual by the reunification with a particular family 
member or to a business by the addition of a new employee cannot be 
                                                 
 62 While “immediate” family members are exempt from the quota, their 
admission into the country reduces the number of visas available to “non-
immediate” family members, who are subject to the quota. 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b)(2)(A)(i). It is also worth noting that there are almost never any employment-
based visas left over from the previous fiscal year. See Stephen H. Legomsky & 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 260–62 (6th 
ed. 2015). 
 63 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c). 
 64 Contra F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
passim (1945) (explaining that there can never be a scientific means of centrally 
managed resource allocation because such allocation would require the use of 
particular knowledge which it could never have). 
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reasonably estimated by an abstract formula.66 Knowledge of this kind 
cannot be collected or aggregated and is specifically the province of 
individuals.67 “Need” is nearly impossible to define in general terms. 
Economist Fredrich A. Hayek famously described why the 
centrally managed allocation of resources was impossible without 
omnipotence.68 The price system (supply and demand), which he 
ardently defended, made use of diffuse knowledge, never knowable to 
a single individual at one time.69 The issue with visa allocation is the 
same, as visas are merely another commodity. The fundamental 
problem with visas fixed by mathematical formulas is a problem of 
forming a rational economic order. Since it is impossible to know who 
will really make the best use of their visas, or even to define what the 
“best use” is, it is impossible to create a properly functional means of 
conscious visa allocation. As Hayek argued, 
[t]he peculiar character of the problem of a rational 
economic order is determined precisely by the fact that 
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must 
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated 
form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of 
society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate 
“given” resources—if “given” is taken to mean given 
to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem 
set by these “data.” It is rather a problem of how to 
secure the best use of resources known to any of the 
members of society, for ends whose relative 
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it 
briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge 
                                                 
 66 For that matter, the requirement that an employer determine that no 
suitable local worker is available for hire ignores all of the potential, personal and 
intangible reasons that may cause a given employer to favor a particular foreign 
individual for the job. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (relating to the issuance of work-related 
immigrant visas and visa requirements). 
 67 Hayek, supra note 64, at 519–20. 
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not given to anyone in its totality. This character of the 
fundamental problem has, I am afraid, been rather 
obscured than illuminated by many of the recent 
refinements of economic theory, particularly by many 
of the uses made of mathematics.70 
Any appearance of scientific exactitude gleaned from the INA 
formulas is illusory; it is “scientistic” rather than scientific.71 Rather 
than being rational, as they appear to be, quotas are irrational, 
regardless of how neat the formulas are. When it comes to something 
as ephemeral and particular as human need, a bureaucratic system of 
management can never respond in such an attentive and appropriate 
way as a market. The arbitrary nature of quotas is the major reason 
why they consistently fail to remain in step with the demand for visas.72 
As people’s needs change, the types of visas they need change too, as 
does the total amount of visas needed. These needs cannot always be 
accommodated by the existing classes of visas or the number of visas 
allocated to each category. The system is too rigid. 
However, the arbitrary nature of quotas is not the only reason 
that they fail to remain in step with visa demand. At the same time that 
the U.S. has endeavored to stem the tide of immigrants at the border, 
it has also pursued policies which make immigration more desirable 
and more likely.73 Congress passed the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 and, a decade later, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).74 While the 
former piece of legislation contained a large amnesty provision, it also 
included penalties for employers who “knowingly” hired 
undocumented immigrants.75 The latter act greatly expanded the 
grounds for inadmissibility and deportability under the INA by 
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 71 F.A. Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec.r 11, 
1974), in LUDWIG VON MISES INST., 2008, at 29, 29–31 (elaborating on the nature 
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 72 Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 445. 
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broadening the definition of “aggravated felony.”76 However, perhaps 
somewhat mercifully, Congress also expanded the general quota in 
1990 and added two new preference categories.77 Nevertheless, since 
the 1980s, the state has attempted to reform immigration by making 
its laws more enforceable rather than more accommodating. Despite 
the government’s best efforts, the number of immigrants—both legal 
and undocumented—has only increased since that time.78 Additionally, 
as was mentioned above, the expansion of the quota did next to 
nothing to address the disconnect between visa supply and demand. 
Immigration reform was not the only feature of the 1990s 
legislative agenda. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was signed into law in 1993, further intertwining the 
economies of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.79 NAFTA “profoundly 
altered” the demand for immigration and labor by intertwining the 
economies of U.S. and Mexico.80 The value of goods exchanged 
between the U.S. and Mexico between 1985 and 2003 increased from 
32.8 billion to 235.5 billion dollars.81 At the same time, trade and the 
effects of comparative advantage disrupted the structure and emphasis 
of both the American and Mexican labor markets.82 Mexico created 
                                                 
 76 Id. See also Wadhia, supra note 12, at 221 (explaining that the meaning of 
an “aggravated felony” was expanded, by broadening the definition of “conviction” 
far beyond its traditional meaning). Even persons with expunged convictions are still 
considered convicted felons under the law, and crimes which are considered 
misdemeanors in some jurisdictions are considered felonies for purposes of 
immigration law, following the passage of the INTC in 1994 and IIRAIRA in 1996. 
See id. at 221–22. 
 77 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 6. 
 78 Id. at 7. 
 79 See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 451–52. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 451. 
 82 See id. at 452. Each country has sectors of its economy which are 
comparatively weaker or stronger than its trade partners. When countries trade with 
one another, it is more efficient to import goods that can be more easily be produced 
abroad than at home, and vice versa. See generally Comparative Advantage, 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/comparative-
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more export-focused manufacturing jobs, but their number of 
agricultural jobs and agricultural output fell. Agriculture shifted in 
favor of the U.S.83 Naturally, the creation of new labor markets within 
the U.S. spurred immigration, and American employers were eager to 
hire more workers. In the decades since the adoption of NAFTA, the 
forces of globalization have only grown stronger in their influence, 
disrupting more labor markets across the planet and increasing the 
need for more fluid immigration and allocation of labor.84 As the U.S. 
has embraced globalization, the notion of a regulated scheme of 
immigration through quotas has become an archaic relic of a more 
economically insular past; its continuation is incompatible with the 
country’s current ambitions and trajectory of economic development. 
It is worth noting that, while the law has not yet changed, 
treaties such as NAFTA are still in effect, and global trade is still 
expanding, the Trump administration’s positions on trade and 
immigration are consistent. The President has levied tariffs against the 
major trade partners of the U.S.—including the E.U., China, Mexico, 
and Canada—in spite of various trade agreements with those 
countries.85 As such, the current administration simultaneously seeks 
to reduce the volume of trade and immigration together, rather than 
promoting one and discouraging the other. Limitations on trade 
should, in theory, reduce the influence of globalization, and thus 
reduce the demand for foreign labor and the volume of immigration. 
However, it is unclear whether these new trade restraints constitute 
permanent changes to U.S. trade policy or whether they will affect 
general trends in trade and immigration. It is possible that the 
administration or its successors will reverse course on this policy, as 
                                                 
 83 See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 452–53. 
 84 See id. at 448, 452–53. 
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U.S. trade partners have all retaliated.86 Moreover, the new trade 
restrictions relate to the importation of specific goods and are not 
general in nature.87 Thus, it seems unlikely that these measures will 
permanently reverse the tide of globalization which drives 
immigration. Further, it is unclear at this time what effect they have 
had on immigration, and no data is yet available to answer this 
question. 
Overall, it still seems fair to say that the immigration policy of 
the U.S. remains incompatible with its economic and trade policies, 
since each has only recently been altered on the administrative level. 
Significant governmental actions are required before it is justifiable to 
say that the U.S. has permanently adopted an anti-trade, anti-
globalization position. Barring broader trade restrictions, legislative 
action, new treaties, and a continuation of this policy by the next 
administration, long lasting state opposition to trade and globalization 
seems unlikely. As such, economic trends will continue to exacerbate 
the shortcomings of the quota-based immigration system. 
B. The State of the Current System 
The very nature of the quota system leads to gross imbalances 
between the demand for visas and the number of visas granted. In 
particular, the regional limitations imposed by the INA have an 
outsized effect on countries with a higher demand for visa applications. 
However, the per-country limits are not set with an intent to limit the 
migration of people of certain ethnicities as they were in the 1920s.88 
Rather, these limits are set in the interest of fairness, so that the 
demand for visas in any particular region does not eclipse or exclude 
visa applicants from other regions.89 To the contrary, INA Section 
202(a) emphasizes that race and national origin are not grounds for 
discrimination.90 In fact, the provision explicitly bars the issuance of 
immigrant visas, and the setting of preferences and priorities, based on 
a “person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of 
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 88 OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). 
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residence.”91 The regional limitations now in place are merely the 
logical consequence of trying to make a quota system “fair.” Where 
there is a cap on the total number of persons admitted, distinctions 
will have to be drawn to ensure no single group is favored to the 
exclusion of the rest. 
When viewed in terms of proportion, this policy is far less just 
in practice than in principle, because the places with the greatest need 
are subject to the greatest limitation. As of November 2016, there were 
4,259,573 applications for visas under the four family preference 
categories, not including the millions more who were exempted from 
the quota as “immediate family members.”92 Within the family 
preference categories, Mexico has 1,308,000 visa applicants patiently 
waiting for admittance, while the remaining top ten nations with the 
most applicants only had between 300,000 and 100,000 applicants.93 
Despite the excessively high demand within the family preference 
category, there was a 15,820 visa limit per-country, including Mexico.94 
At the same time, there were also 107,479 applications for visas filed 
under the employment-based visa categories.95 India, mainland China, 
and the Philippines collectively accounted for the overwhelming 
majority of employment-based applications, numbering 98,948 in 
total.96 However, each of these countries was only allotted 9,800 
employment visas in accordance with INA Section 202.97 Since the 
countries with the highest demand for visas are allotted so few, the 
applicants from those countries must wait a very long time for 
admittance. By contrast, applicants from countries with less demand 
will face shorter wait times. 
The current backlog of applications is also immense and 
intractable. Immigrant visa applications are filed all around the globe 
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but can only be satisfied when there are visas available for issue. Since 
this can take a considerable amount of time, lines form and a backlog 
of applications builds up. It can take up to two decades before an 
applicant’s priority date becomes current, allowing them to apply for 
permanent resident status.98 Prior to that, they file a petition, which is 
then processed, and while processing itself is rather sluggish, one’s 
priority date only becomes current when there are visas available for 
the applicant’s particular preference category and country of origin.99 
Thus, the wait times for Mexican, Chinese, Indian, and Filipino 
applicants are usually extremely long.100 For example, in 2013, Filipino 
siblings of U.S. citizens faced wait times of roughly twenty-three years 
while those of Mexican origin faced wait times of up to sixteen years.101 
By contrast, siblings of U.S. citizens from nations with substantially 
fewer applications faced wait times of up to thirteen years.102 While 
wait times for most visa applications are long, the seven-percent cap 
imposed on nations with higher volumes of applications makes wait 
times for those countries extreme. At the very least, the length of time 
applications wait to become current indicates that present visa 
allotments are grossly out of step with the demand for visas.103 It is 
also fairly clear that the law does not adequately take into account the 
inequities that result from demand varying from place to place, despite 
the stated goals of INA Section 202(a).104 All in all, the Migration Policy 
Institute estimates that it could take up to nineteen years to completely 
clear the backlog.105 
The preference category a green card applicant selects can also 
have a drastic impact on his or her wait time. It may be that an 
applicant is eligible for multiple visa categories, but that filing for one 
type of visa over another could mean a wait difference of a few decades 
or more. For example, in India, applicants filing for an EB-1 visa, for 
persons of “extraordinary ability,” face a projected wait time of only 
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six years for their visas to become current.106 Whereas, people filing 
EB-3 applications for persons with bachelor’s degrees face wait times 
of up to seventeen years.107 EB-2 applicants from India, or those with 
advanced degrees, face an incredible projected wait time of one-hundred 
and fifty years, effectively barring their admittance.108 This means that 
the choice of filing for one’s application is a highly strategic decision. 
However, when the shortest wait times belong to the most exclusive 
categories, and when those times are also many years long, immigration 
to the U.S. from certain countries may not be an option at all. This 
results in the same kind of region by region discrimination that the 
INA was supposed to undo. 
Of course, there are more consequences to centrally managed 
immigration and arbitrary allocation of visas than long wait times. The 
closed nature of the system comes at a high economic cost, creating 
black market labor, encouraging worker exploitation, and forcing 
taxpayers to fund the Sisyphean project of restricting the natural 
movement of people at the borders.109 This is especially true with 
regard to Mexican immigration.110 As economic forces continue to 
encourage Mexican workers to enter the American labor market, 
restrictive granting of both temporary and permanent work visas 
contributes to increased undocumented traffic into the country.111 This 
makes border enforcement more difficult and more expensive, because 
incentives created by the law encourage the violation of the law. 
Meanwhile, stricter border enforcement and stiffer penalties for 
entering the country without authorization discourage the temporary 
migration of seasonal agricultural workers. Threatened with 
detainment and permanent bars to future reentry into the U.S., it often 
seems wiser to simply remain in the U.S. than to attempt to return to 
Mexico. Such an attempt would raise the risk of capture and economic 
exile from the country due to enhanced border security. Ironically, the 
draconian enforcement of laws designed to restrict immigration and 
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unlawful presence converts would-be economic migrants into 
permanent settlers by reducing migrants’ incentives to return to their 
countries of origin. 
Worse still, when migrants and immigrants are undocumented 
they become at risk for blackmail, coercion, and worker exploitation.112 
Due to the fact that they are in the country without valid 
documentation and often exist outside the system, undocumented 
immigrants and migrants operate without the protection of U.S. 
federal and state labor laws.113 This is especially true of unskilled 
workers.114 Moreover, the threat of detainment and deportation can be 
used as a weapon by employers—as well as others—to exploit 
undocumented persons who stand to lose their entire livelihoods.115 In 
combination, this means that people drawn to the U.S. by promises of 
economic opportunity may become trapped in inhospitable working 
conditions for little pay because they have the prospect of deportation 
hanging over their heads. 
Curiously, black market labor conditions also provide 
undocumented persons a competitive edge over domestic workers.116 
Since undocumented workers can work for less than minimum wage, 
and since their labor conditions are not subject to regulation, this 
makes them less costly and therefore more desirable than domestic 
workers and documented immigrants.117 Thus, it stands to reason that 
a more liberal immigration policy, and the uninhibited issuance of 
visas, would equalize competition between domestic and foreign 
workers. Domestic and documented workers would not be undercut 
to the same degree by undocumented workers, because fewer workers 
would be undocumented. Additionally, fewer undocumented 
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workers—either immigrants or temporary laborers—would be subject 
to exploitation because of their status. 
C. Attempts at Reform 
Over the years there have been many proposed reforms 
offered to fix the American immigration system. Conventionally 
defined, “comprehensive proposals” usually attempt to address most 
of the problems with immigration at once. Functionally, these 
proposals try to address five key aspects of immigration policy and 
their associated problems.118 First, they offer provisions for 
accommodating the undocumented immigrants currently residing in 
the country.119 Second, they attempt to account for the future flow of 
immigrants and the changes in demand for visas.120 Third, they attempt 
to reduce processing and wait times that currently plague the system.121 
Fourth, they place emphasis on creating more targeted immigration, 
border, and customs enforcement.122 Finally, they attempt to mitigate 
any domestic economic hardship that may result from further 
immigration.123 However, the various proposals go about this in 
different ways and with different points of emphasis. 
Many—if not most—reform proposals focus on heightened 
border security, amnesty, and the elimination of red tape. Yet, these 
proposals do not radically alter the current system or its architecture. 
Instead, they simply intend to streamline it. New provisions mandate 
electronic documentation, more precise filing dates, and an increase in 
funding for border security.124 In terms of satisfying the goals of 
comprehensive reform, the recommended measures do address the 
key goals but fail to treat the underlying problem, which is the attempt 
to manage the flow of immigration in the first place. The 
misperception that immigration regulation is a function of sovereignty 
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has not been shed by many of these authors.125 Truly comprehensive 
reforms would require the abolition of the quota system, the creation 
of an efficient system of application processing, and a change in 
attitude, which would leave behind more modern notions of 
“sovereignty.” However, from a practical perspective, it makes sense 
that, despite their comprehensive scope, most proposed reforms 
attempt merely to modify the existing structure of the law; that task is 
comparatively easy. Unfortunately, many proposals also 
overemphasize security or make use of negative reinforcement to 
manage immigration flows and labor demands. 
Congress recently attempted to pass immigration reform, in 
response to the Trump administration’s recision of the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA).126 However, as of 
publication of this comment, this reform bill has not been passed.127 
S.1615, or the Dream Act of 2017, would have enshrined DACA in 
law, whereas DACA previously existed merely as a form of 
prosecutorial discretion prescribed by the Obama administration.128 
Thus, the bill would cancel the removal of “dreamers,” now of-age 
persons who unlawfully entered the U.S. as children, so long as they 
were not considered inadmissible for some other reason detailed in the 
INA. It would also create a pathway for dreamers to become Lawful 
Permanent Residents. However, like DACA, the Dream Act is not 
comprehensive. The only persons eligible for its protection are those 
who were present for four years before the bill’s passage.129 Those who 
entered the country after that time could not claim its benefits: namely, 
stays of removal and a pathway to Lawful Permanent Resident 
status.130 Unfortunately, this means that the Dream Act offers only a 
temporary fix available to a select group of people. The problem the 
bill attempts to address will persist for similarly situated people who 
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have entered after that time and for justly aggrieved people in different 
circumstances not comprehended by DACA. 
DACA and the Dream Act are thought to be necessary because 
it seems fundamentally unjust to enact removal proceedings against 
people who have lived the majority of their lives in the U.S. Culturally, 
many dreamers are American and have little or no meaningful ties to 
their country of birth.131 They are trapped by circumstance because as 
children they entered or remained in the country unlawfully as 
dependents of their parents.132 
However, the circumstances which lead to the necessity of 
DACA and the Dream Act are created by the INA itself. As previously 
discussed, the wait times for immigrant visas are extremely long and 
even longer for countries which exceed the seven-percent limit placed 
on visa issuance.133 “Illegal” immigration is thus incentivized, and black 
markets for immigration are formed in response.134 By consequence, 
the arbitrary nature of the law is brought into full view; people who 
have lived in the U.S. for virtually their entire lives are treated as 
unamerican by the law and live under constant threat of removal. This 
is why many proposals include an amnesty provision; it is impractical 
and unjust to remove large numbers of productive and peaceful people 
who established roots inside the country. 
Prior comprehensive reforms, such as IRCA in 1986, 
contained amnesty provisions but also covered other areas of the 
law.135 IRCA was described as a “three-legged stool” which granted 
amnesty to persons already residing illegally in the U.S. but also 
enhanced border security and created penalties for hiring 
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undocumented immigrants.136 In doing so, IRCA attempted to 
discourage further unlawful immigration.137 Current political 
discussions surrounding the Dream Act also indicate that its passage 
will require the inclusion of more border security provisions and 
possibly the construction of a border wall.138 Indeed, even the more 
positive aspects of the bill, such as pathways to citizenship, have been 
considerably weakened throughout the course of negotiation.139 Since 
these reforms build off of the current structure of the law, they often 
draw from a sort of carrot-and-stick approach. They grant amnesty but 
couple it with punishments and enhanced security for the future. 
The incentives for illegal immigration to the U.S. are strong 
because, despite the INA’s emphasis on family-based immigration, 
employment is also a large driver of immigration.140 By consequence, 
there is a large backlog of work visa applications, which encourages 
understandably frustrated applicants to bypass the system.141 Thus, to 
solve the problem, many proposals increase the quota limit for work 
visas or reallocate a greater share of the existing visa supply to the 
worker categories. For example, the Secure America Act of 2005 would 
have allocated 400,000 visas to a new “H-5” worker visa category.142 
The exact supply of these H-5 visas would have been allowed to 
increase or decrease somewhat based on demand.143 Another bill, 
proposed at the same time as the Secure America Act, would have 
expanded the availability of temporary worker visas under a newly 
invented “W” category.144 The former bill was advertised as “market-
based” when it was proposed, because it focused on worker categories 
and attempted to expand quotas to better accommodate the demand 
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for visas.145 However, it is misleading to describe the bill as market-
based because it still placed a fixed number on the amount of visas that 
could be issued. A truly market-centered approach would not set a cap 
on the issuance of any particular kind of visa to the exclusion of others, 
based on the perceived needs of policymakers, because markets 
allocate resources unconsciously.146 Moreover, a truly market-oriented 
approach would not set an artificial cap on the supply of available visas. 
Markets are not and cannot be guided by means of central 
administration.147 
Another major push for comprehensive reform was made in 
2007. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, or 
“Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform 
Act of 2007,” like previous bills, would have created a new visa 
category.148 This one would have created transitional “Y” and “Z” 
visas, which were designed specifically to adjust to permanent resident 
status.149 This would have allowed more people to wait inside the U.S., 
rather than in their countries of origin, so that the visa wait times would 
not overly disrupt the lives of prospective immigrants. It failed to 
pass.150 While this solution would not have eliminated or curbed wait 
times caused by visa quotas, it might have made their effects less 
pernicious. However, the bill also included more nativist provisions, 
such as one that made English the national language and another which 
restricted familial migration to immediate relatives only.151 This latter 
provision was designed to end chain migration.152 
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While most proposals attempt in some way to alleviate the 
disparity in supply and demand for visas, they also seek to enhance 
administrative efficiency in the enforcement of the law. Despite adding 
provisions which contribute to the INA’s complexity—such as new 
visa categories and nuanced eligibility requirements for each of them—
reformers seek to cut through red tape by consolidating federal 
databases to make the application process more streamlined.153 These 
same efficiency measures are also intended to augment enforcement 
of immigration laws.154 Many, including the reform acts of 2007, 
introduce digital registries which make things like proof of 
employment or visa currency more efficient and accessible.155 This has 
potential to speed up the application process for preference categories 
that require proof of employment.156 The is what the e-verify program 
does.157 
The digitizing of information is intended to consolidate the 
knowledge of various federal and state agencies and thereby enhance 
efficiency.158 In particular, the data gathered from the Employment 
Eligibility Verification System would be used to identify employers 
engaged in the unlawful hiring of immigrants who are not eligible to 
work in the U.S. This would be achieved through a careful monitoring 
of social security numbers.159 Although it makes perfect sense to 
digitize the system for the sake of efficiency, doing so is a double-edged 
sword. More effective enforcement of the immigration law means that 
the law will increasingly conflict with the demands of the labor market. 
                                                 
backlog means that, at present, the progression from person A to C could take 
decades to resolve; a move from A to D could take close to a century. “Chain 
migration” has, for this reason, become a loaded and often misleading term. Contra 
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 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 36. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:1 
216 
As globalization continues to exert its influence, the country is 
projected to become increasingly reliant on foreign-born workers.160 
Constricting the flow of labor, and doing so more effectively, appears 
counterproductive. 
Despite laudable goals of increasing visa access and enhancing 
administrative efficiency, reformers often include measures which 
reemphasize U.S. sovereignty and security. The assertion of 
sovereignty is often expressed through measures which enhance 
border security and enforcement, even when doing so is highly 
problematic. For example, the Employment Eligibility Verification 
System would rely on the REAL ID Act for enforcement.161 That act 
enabled immigration judges to deny relief to immigrants merely 
because they lack written proof of hardship.162 It also restricts habeas 
corpus rights in places where the INA bars judicial review.163 This can 
lead to undue hardship and lack of due process for certain kinds of 
immigrants, and refugees in particular.164 
Border security is also emphasized to an often irrational extent. 
However, this may be because it is a politically popular measure. Given 
that the majority of persons unlawfully present in the U.S. entered with 
inspection, and thus did not illegally cross the border, border 
enforcement certainly seems overemphasized.165 It is evident that this 
is motivated by notions of sovereignty, even in the naming of the bills. 
For example, the names of the Secure America Act and the Secure 
Borders Act, covered above, clearly assert the authors’ intents to 
solidify American borders and thus assert the sovereignty of the 
country. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 would 
have added 20,000 more full-time U.S. Border Patrol agents to the 
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BPA, along with 370 miles of fencing along the U.S.–Mexico border.166 
The Trump administration has also echoed calls for expansion of the 
border patrol.167 In particular, President Trump requested 15,000 more 
agents for the Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), despite its possible deleterious effects on agency 
competency.168 Increases to border fencing were also called for in the 
CLEAR Act, which would have enabled state police officers to enforce 
immigration laws in a manner similar to ICE, and converted the civil 
offense of unlawful presence into a criminal offense.169 
Overall, most proposed reforms are mixed bags. In reality, they 
are inadequate suggestions that also include some rather harmful 
provisions. In general, all of the proposals detailed above suffer from 
two major flaws. First, and most importantly, they fail to change the 
fundamental mechanism of visa allocation provided by the INA. 
Second, by placing an emphasis on security and enforcement of the 
existing law, they exacerbate the inefficiencies and black-market 
incentives created by the quota system. The best remedy detailed 
above, transitional visas—designed to alleviate the pain of waiting for 
permanent visas—is only a half measure.170 Other suggestions, like 
new visa categories and an increase of 400,000 available visas, are also 
only temporary solutions to the imbalance of visa demand and 
supply.171 In time, demand may again come to exceed the supply; thus, 
such measures are, at the very least, not stable solutions. 
Crackdowns on immigration enforcement exacerbate the pains 
caused by the inefficiencies inherent in the allotment of visas. The long 
wait times created by the lack of visa supply is in part alleviated by 
unlawful migration. Lax enforcement of immigration laws provides 
people who could otherwise not afford to wait in a twenty-year long 
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line the ability to live their lives in the U.S., even though they might 
place themselves at risk for removal.172 While this does open up 
unfortunate possibilities of worker exploitation, such issues would be 
better attended to by vigorous enforcement of employment law and 
worker’s rights rather than immigration law.173 While one might argue 
that overstaying one’s visa or entering without a visa is unfair to those 
who have patiently waited, one cannot know what exigencies, 
challenges, or pressing concerns any particular individual faces. Yet, in 
most cases, immigrants, documented and undocumented, have lived 
peacefully in the U.S. for more than a decade.174 Crackdowns on 
enforcement may incentivize overstays, for fear that one may not be 
able to reenter the country after making a small mistake. Aside from 
this risk, crackdowns on immigration enforcement and stricter border 
security may simply make the lives of good people needlessly difficult. 
In general, the efforts expended during enforcement are 
asymmetrically disproportionate to the risks of lax enforcement. 
IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND A PATH FORWARD 
A. Proposed Policy Changes 
An open and generous immigration policy would best meet the 
five general goals of comprehensive immigration reform, because it 
would alleviate the systemic imbalances created by the present 
incarnation of the INA. First, a general amnesty provision could 
accommodate people who are already here unlawfully. Second, visas 
issued without quota limits, with simple eligibility requirements, could 
eliminate the current backlog of applications. The backlog exists 
because more people apply for visas every year than there are visas 
                                                 
 172 Consider that those seeking employment in the United States must often 
demonstrate that they have a job before their visa is approved. The wait time 
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available.175 If there were no quota and visas were issued according to 
market demand, then there would be no delay other than processing. 
There would be little issue accommodating the future flow of 
immigrants because such a system would not attempt to manage it. 
Visas would simply be issued as qualifying people apply. Third, without 
complex visa preference categories, processing times could be reduced. 
General immigrant visas could simply require that the applicant meet 
basic health standards and satisfy criminal background checks. The 
visa applicant would no-longer have to navigate complex employment 
requirements or prove that they are of some specific familial relation 
to a sponsor. No visa sponsors would be required. In this context, 
digitization of the process could also help streamline applications. 
Finally, because incentives for black-market labor and immigration 
would be reduced by the unlimited availability of legitimate visas, 
enforcement of current border and customs law would become less 
burdensome. Fewer people would be in violation of the law because 
they would have access to legitimate alternatives. How this might 
impact domestic laborers is another question. 
A general amnesty provision is necessary for comprehensive 
reform. People who are already peacefully residing in the country 
deserve to stay. However, the amnesty provision must be as sweeping 
as possible. It must also be accompanied by another provision that 
renders future grants of amnesty unnecessary, as amnesty is always a 
temporary solution. Thus, the provision of the INA which penalizes 
unlawful presence must also be amended.176 When a non-citizen has 
not committed an actual crime, it should always be possible for the 
non-citizen to re-enter the country or adjust oneself to legal status. 
Waivers for hardship must not be the only exceptions to the rule.177 
Rather, bars to re-entry themselves should be the exception. They 
should be reserved solely for non-citizens who have committed serious 
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crimes or pose dangers to the public health. In general, the only limit 
on re-entry into the U.S. should be the time it takes to process a valid 
visa, whether temporary or permanent. 
Amnesty provisions necessarily have certain drawbacks. Aside 
from being temporary fixes which do not help contend with future 
undocumented populations, they also seem to do some harm to the 
rule of law. People who are residing in the U.S. unlawfully, after all, are 
here unlawfully. To forgive their transgressions en masse is to 
undermine the legitimacy of law itself. “Amnesty,” because of this 
notion, has become somewhat of a dirty word.178 However, the rule of 
law is threatened more by the conditions created by the current 
immigration system and the INA than it would be by a temporary 
measure designed to alleviate those conditions. A law that encourages 
its own violation does harm to the rule of law. Black market labor, 
border evasion, entry without inspection, and unlawful presence itself, 
are all, in part, the result of too few available visas. While the unlimited 
issuance of visas, regulated merely by demand, would solve these 
problems, it could not assist the millions of people who are already 
ineligible for visas due to the accrual of unlawful presence. Therefore, 
an amnesty provision would be needed. 
The most necessary element of truly comprehensive reform is 
the complete elimination of all visa quotas. This requires the repeal of 
INA § 203 and the seven-percent per-country allocation limit of INA 
§ 202. There should be no ceiling for the issuance of visas. They should 
be issued on an unlimited basis, whenever a qualified applicant applies. 
While some might object that unlimited visas would allow an 
unmanageable number of immigrants into the U.S., this is not the case. 
Immigration flows are mostly self-regulating. Although visas are 
theoretically unlimited, rates of immigration tend to vary alongside the 
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unemployment rate and economic conditions in general.179 Low 
unemployment rates tend to coincide with high rates of immigration.180 
Whereas, when the unemployment rate is high, rates of immigration 
are reduced.181 Thus, we will never be overwhelmed by immigrants. 
They come when there is room for them, and when they can find 
opportunity. Pull factors are relative to the present condition of our 
country, and so people generally come only when the conditions are 
comparatively favorable to those of their own. For example, the recent, 
net-negative rate of immigration coincided with the 2008 financial 
crisis.182 Similar drops in immigration occurred during the Great 
Depression.183 If anything, rates of immigration are a vital sign that 
indicates the health of the country. High rates of immigration indicate 
good health. 
Some might fear the consequences of quota-less immigration. 
Two principal concerns are that the high demand for visas might 
overburden the state’s administrative apparatus and that a flood of 
foreign workers might depress domestic wages and working 
conditions. These fears are misguided. Initially, the current backlog 
might create a temporary flood of applications which the current 
bureaucratic infrastructure could not accommodate. However, there is 
little reason to imagine that this problem would remain an issue 
forever. The backlog is a side effect of the quotas which suppressed 
the supply of visas. In time, that would subside and give way to more 
regular requests for visas. At the moment, there is a mass of people 
waiting in line. But without a quota, a buildup of visa applications is 
less likely because they will be granted as needed. The current of 
applications will become steady, even if the initial rush is like a tidal 
wave. To mitigate the impact of the initial rush, it may also be necessary 
to bolster the resources available to consulates and federal agencies 
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charged with processing applications. To that end, it is advisable to 
increase funding to relevant agencies prior to enacting this proposal. 
The second concern is more complicated. However, a more 
liberal immigration policy would reduce the frequency of unfair 
competition between foreign and domestic workers. People who are 
U.S. citizens or documented workers are subject to labor laws, 
minimum wage laws, and entitled to certain benefits. All of this makes 
them far costlier to hire than people who can be paid at any wage and 
who are not entitled to any sort of protection. However, by making it 
easy to acquire documentation and enter the system, the incentive to 
work at depressed wages is reduced. This is particularly true when 
documentation offers the promise of higher wages and hospitable 
working conditions, as mandated by law. Moreover, because rates of 
immigration rise alongside economic growth and strong employment 
numbers, there is little reason to suppose that immigration will depress 
wages or harm domestic rates of employment.184 
Optimally, all worker and familial preference categories should 
be done away with, alongside the quotas themselves. With a limitless 
supply of visas available for eligible persons, it would seem useless to 
draw distinctions between types of applicants. However, policymakers 
may still wish to retain visa categories in order to protect domestic 
laborers. If that is the case, no numerical limits need to be set, but visas 
could still be issued based on whether an applicant satisfies the 
requirements of any given category. If an applicant could not prove 
that they would not threaten domestic employment, the visa could still 
be denied, absent a quota. The backlog would still be relatively minimal 
because there would be no “line” for pending application currency. 
Whenever an applicant satisfied the conditions of admission, they 
could be admitted. In either case, the abolition of quotas would vastly 
improve the present situation and problems with the law. 
However, preference categories ought to be abolished. 
Without quotas, the preference categories seem superfluous. If an 
applicant fails to meet the qualifications of one visa category, they 
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could simply apply for another. As there is no limit to the number of 
visas available, visa types would not be much of an obstacle. The 
choice of application one files is already strategic, as mentioned above. 
People choose whichever preference category affords them the best 
chance of timely admission. Moreover, as they are arbitrary distinctions 
which do not objectively assess the potential benefits of individual 
immigrant’s admissions, or the national interest, preference categories 
should be gotten rid of. Absent quotas, preference categories provide 
no tangible benefit to the public interest. 
Finally, this proposal would not require any serious change to 
customs and border enforcement law. The reduction of wait times 
would inherently make the law more enforceable, because there would 
be less incentive to violate the law. Assuming that adequate 
background checks and security at points of entry are carried out, there 
should be little security risk from greater volumes of legal immigrants 
entering the country. National security and public health interests can 
still be protected. There is no reason not to screen visa applicants. 
There just might be more of them to screen. While this may increase 
processing time for applications, the primary cause of the backlog—a 
limited supply of visas—will still be addressed. Therefore, the 
incentives to follow the law will not be meaningfully diminished 
because wait times will not be egregious, or decades long. Overall, it is 
easier to address national security and public health concerns when it 
is known who is in the country and when they have been vetted. To 
accomplish this, people must be encouraged to enter the country 
legally and to submit to inspection. Thus, an open and liberal 
immigration policy would further protect U.S. security and public 
health interests. 
B. Historical Analogues & Shifts in Attitudes 
Although the Chinese Exclusion laws were passed in the 1870s, 
they did not reflect the general character or framework of the law. 
Rather, they were an explicit exception to the law. Immigration into 
the country was unrestricted.185 Visas were also not a requirement until 
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after World War I. Prior to this period, migration between the U.S. and 
other nations was fairly open and free-flowing. 
While for most of the nation’s history borders were 
unrestricted and migration and immigration were unregulated, this 
might have been, to some degree, a matter of practicality rather than 
desire. Technological or financial issues could have rendered strong 
border enforcement impossible. Yet, it is highly doubtful that anyone 
could have said that condition diminished the nation’s sovereignty. 
The U.S. thrived in this period, in part because immigrant labor helped 
fuel the industrial revolution and westward expansion. The United 
States’ power as a nation-state was visibly augmented. By World War 
I, the U.S. was a prominent player on the world stage. What processing 
did occur was often done at ports and other common points of entry; 
control of infectious disease was the primary concern.186 It is also 
worth noting that even after this era had ended and the National 
Origins Quota System had gone into effect, the country’s immediate 
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, were exempted from the law.187 
Enforcement of strong physical borders was not a priority. 
The modern notion of strong borders and the regulation of 
immigration arose in part because of Chinese Exclusion. The inevitable 
legal battles that resulted from the passage of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act helped establish the plenary powers doctrine.188 This doctrine 
afforded the government virtually unlimited power to regulate 
immigration as a natural extension of its sovereignty and established 
that non-citizens have little or no constitutional protections.189 If we 
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can rediscover older notions of sovereignty, it may be easier to 
convince people that an open border state would not injure the country 
or the rule of law. 
The Supreme Court recently ruled on a case that promised to 
reconsider the scope of the plenary power. It was hoped by some, 
including this author, that a negative ruling on the Trump 
administration’s travel ban would narrow the reach of the plenary 
power, or perhaps even spell its doom.190 This would, in turn, create 
room for a national reconsideration of the relationship between border 
security and sovereignty. Modern notions of sovereignty were born as 
a justification for the Chinese Exclusion Act and expressed as the 
plenary powers doctrine. If that doctrine were undermined, it is 
possible that a shift in law could influence a subsequent shift in the 
public conception of sovereignty. That would make a meaningful 
change in policy all the more probable. 
Instead, the Court implicitly endorsed the plenary power, the 
power of Congress to manage immigration with great judicial 
deference, and confirmed that Congress could delegate that power to 
the President.191 Moreover, the Court also expanded the scope of the 
power as applied to the President.192 They expanded the modern 
expression of the plenary power, articulated in Fiallo v. Bell, saying, 
“[f]or more than a century, this Court has recognized that the 
admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental 
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control.’”193 Ultimately, the 
Court upheld the travel ban, applying nothing more than rational basis 
review.194 Thus, while hope that the Court and the nation might 
reconsider the plenary powers doctrine and its relationship to U.S. 
sovereignty is not lost, it has been greatly diminished. 
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In many ways, the law as it existed before the National Origins 
Quota Act, or even the Chinese Exclusion Act, serves as an excellent 
model for a comprehensive reform proposal going forward. History 
illustrates that rather than harming U.S. workers, the nation was better 
off as a result of immigration. The modern experience illustrates this 
as well.195 Given that the modern economy is increasingly intertwined 
with that of Mexico and Canada, the reduction of any barriers between 
all three countries also seems logical; a reversion to this state of affairs 
would be a positive change. Processing and approval for entry at ports 
and airports should remain for security and health reasons, but the 
larger bureaucratic framework could be markedly reduced. Specific 
enforcement of land borders could also be largely abandoned. With 
the law enforcement emphasis cast aside, a more market-oriented 
system of free migration could replace the antiquated quota model. 
The government would still retain the power to deport criminals, as it 
has since its inception. However, a system of free migration and 
immigration would virtually eliminate wait times and sharply reduce 
the amount of bureaucratic red tape. Sadly, much must change, 
culturally and legally, before such reform is possible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite various reforms and reform proposals, the core policy 
instituted by the INA is archaic, and cannot be remedied. The quotas 
and preference categories that characterize the system are inherently 
arbitrary and remain in conflict with U.S. economic interests and the 
basic laws of supply and demand.196 The consequences have been long 
wait times, miles of red tape, and people deprived of opportunities to 
work or live with their families.197 By examining history and shifting 
the emphasis away from sovereignty and back to economic expansion, 
it is possible to correct these wrongs, although this shift is unlikely to 
occur. The INA quota system ought to be abandoned in favor of a 
system of free migration and immigration. 
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A system of free migration and immigration, rooted in the 
actual demand for visas, could eliminate the unjust backlog created by 
the quota system. It would also conceivably reduce the burdens of 
enforcing immigration and customs law. The processing of visas would 
go more smoothly because there would be less required to file an 
application. One would simply need to satisfy basic requirements 
relating to health and public safety. Rather than creating a lawless 
atmosphere, it would simply make the law more realistic, manageable, 
and reflective of people’s needs. There is also little need to reduce the 
strength of the U.S. security apparatus. As more people apply for legal 
status within the U.S., less energy will be required to police the activity 
of those who do not. However, such a proposal will face significant 
opposition, and its enactment is, sadly, unlikely. 
At present, the U.S. has a strong tradition of sovereignty, but 
popular notions of what that entails are newer than is commonly 
understood.198 This tradition is unlikely to change, as suggested by the 
most recent Supreme Court precedent on the subject.199 Maintaining 
porous borders and allowing theoretically limitless migration and 
immigration from all corners of the Earth seemingly threatens this 
tradition. However, the threat is misbegotten. Sovereignty comes from 
a nation’s ability to enforce its own laws, not the solidity of its borders. 
Further, migration and immigration are not limitless; they are regulated 
by supply and demand. Demand is not always high. During times of 
economic strife in the U.S., or prosperity elsewhere, rates of 
immigration and migration into the U.S. are reduced.200 The 
unemployment rate is actually lower when the rate of immigration is 
higher, and vice-versa.201 In order for a system of free migration to 
become politically feasible, myths of what sovereignty is and is not 
must be broken. In order to do this, it is necessary for the public to 
acquire greater knowledge of the United States’ immigration history. 
                                                 
 198 See Ting, supra note 21, at 303–07 (explaining that these notions arise out 
of Supreme Court cases contrived to justify the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
establishing the plenary power). 
 199 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–19 (upholding the principle that the 
executive and legislative branches wield extensive power over “the admission and 
exclusion of foreign nationals. . . .”). 
 200 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 204. 
 201 Bier, supra note 179. 
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In particular, Americans must understand that the management of 
immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon.202 They must realize 
that the present system runs counter to the country’s long history of 
free migration. 
In conclusion, the INA should be amended to abandon the 
quota framework in favor of a system of natural allocation of visas 
based on market principles. Presently, most other parts of the law are 
negatively impacted by stresses created by the quota system. American 
cultural dedication to sovereignty prevents such a proposal from 
succeeding, but more conservative reform efforts would not 
adequately address current issues. Therefore, radical change is needed 
to reform one particular aspect of the INA: the quotas. 
                                                 
 202 See generally OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2 at 1–7. 
